Coyne, Part 3: Back into the moral maze

This is the final part of my review of Jerry Coyne’s Why Evolution is True. The first two parts are here and here.

In the final chapter of his book, Coyne tries to allay the fears of those who worry that belief  in evolution will cause society to crumble. I have two major problems with this chapter.

Science and Materialism

The chapter gets off to a bad start:

“Pearcey argues (and many American creationists agree) that all the perceived evils of evolution come from two worldviews that are part of science: naturalism and materialism. Naturalism is the view that the only way to understand our universe is through the scientific method. Materialism is the idea that the only reality is the physical matter of the universe, and that everything else, including thoughts, will, and emotions, comes from physical laws acting on matter. The message of evolution, and all of science, is one of naturalistic materialism … we manage to understand the natural world just fine using reason and materialism. Furthermore, supernatural explanations always mean the end of inquiry: that’s the way God wants it, end of story. Science, on the other hand, is never satisfied: our studies of the universe will continue until we go extinct.” (pg 244-5)

This section is full of holes. It is a simple fact that naturalism and materialism are not part of science. They are worldviews which go beyond science. Take materialism – I agree with Coyne’s definition. If science is the study of the material world, then it cannot conclude that there is no reality beyond the material world – just as if your trap can only catches lobsters, you cannot conclude that there are only lobsters in the lake. Materialism may be true, but it logically cannot be a deduction from science. As I have argued elsewhere, science can be placed in a theistic universe. Ultimately, we do not want to know if supernaturalism ends inquiry. We want to know if it is true.

Further, science must ultimately face inquiry-stoppers. Coyne, as a biologist, can consider his work done when he has reduced biological phenomena to chemical ones. Chemistry seeks to ground its data in physical laws. But there is nothing under physics. Physical laws are the bottom level. As a biologist, Coyne is, in a sense, insulated from the “bottom turtle” that is fundamental physics. How should we approach fundamental physical laws? Perhaps “that’s just how things are. There is a chain of explanations concerning things that happen in the universe, which ultimately reaches to the fundamental laws of nature and stops” (Sean Carroll). One day, someone might write an equation on a blackboard, receive a round of applause, and fundamental physics will stop. All deeper questions will be in vain – ask if you like, but no answer can ever be found. In that case, how is  “that‘s just what the laws of nature are” better than “that’s what God chose the laws of nature to be”? (That wasn’t a rhetorical question!).

Evolution and Morality

Coyne then turns to evolution and morality. As in his critique of ID, he seems to drastically underestimate what he is up against. Take the following passage:

“The biggest misconception is that accepting evolution will somehow sunder our society, wreck our morality, impel us to behave like beasts, and spawn a new generation of Hitlers and Stalins. That just won’t happen, as we know from the many European countries whose residents wholly embrace evolution, yet manage to remain civilised.”

This is the “we can all agree on the Grand Canyon” problem again (see part 1). Here is how a creationist would respond to Coyne’s claim:

The horrible school shooting in Finland in 2007 is a prime example. The killer stated: “I am prepared to fight and die for my cause…I, as a natural selector, will eliminate all who I see unfit, disgraces of human race and failures of natural selection. I am just an animal, a human, an individual, a dissident …It’s time to put natural selection and survival of the fittest back on track!”

(Before I become the victim of internetitude, I’m not endorsing this passage. Please read the whole post carefully before commenting!)

What argument does Coyne give to persuade us that evolution does not have these moral consequences? He says:

“Does evolutionary biology even claim that we’re genetically hardwired to behave like our supposedly beastly forebears? … there is a huge scientific literature on how evolution can favor genes that lead to cooperation, altruism, and even morality … Are we wired to be selfish, cooperative or both?” (pg 246)

“There is no end of theories (and books) about how [moral codes, religion, and music, inter alia] may have evolved … in the end these ideas come down to untested – and probably untestable – speculations. It’s almost impossible to reconstruct how these features evolved (or even if they are genetic traits) … we should be deeply suspicious of speculations that come unaccompanied by hard evidence …There is no reason, then, to see ourselves as marionettes dancing on the strings of evolution … Genes aren’t destiny … genetic does not mean unchangeable … evolution tells us where we have come from, not where we can go.” (pg 251)

Coyne argues as follows: because we do not know which (if any) human behaviours are hardwired by evolution, we are free to act morally. This is both incorrect and irrelevant. Just because we have not worked out which human behaviours are hardwired, it does not mean that none are. If we are genetically determined to be selfish, then our ignorance of this fact does not change the fact itself. However, Coyne rejects genetic determinism. I believe he is correct, but he does not give any argument to support this rejection.

More importantly, Coyne’s response completely misses the point. Moral practice has always been difficult, but least in the good old days there was the light of moral principles. We had a standard to live up to – our failings were our failings. If Coyne’s materialism is true, then traditional morals are just behaviors – at best, adaptive ones. We feel the compulsion to protect our family because this behaviour is selected for, not because of some transcendent moral duty. Now, Coyne notes, we are still free to act in accordance with this impulse. But we are just as free not too. Coyne’s assertion that “evolution tells us where we have come from, not where we can go” means that we logically cannot deduce any moral principles from the set of beliefs and behaviours that evolution has given us. We are above them. The inner voice of conscience telling you not to steal … we know what that is, or more to the point, what it isn’t. The choice between listening to that voice or yielding to temptation is not the choice between sticking to our moral principles or not. These impulses, in and of themselves, give us no moral guidance whatsoever. Put simply, we have no moral obligation to listen to an inner voice which is, in the end, telling us how our ancestors beat the survival odds.

It follows that there are no objective moral principles on materialism. Biological evolution is not the issue here: on theism, evolutionary behaviours can be a gradual, fallible progression toward grasping objective moral principles, just as evolution has provided us with senses by which we have fallibly grasp the laws of nature. But on materialism the forces that shaped our moral senses are not themselves moral. They are not aimed at transcendent moral principles, societal stability, personal integrity, character, happiness, fulfilment, tolerance, maturity, responsibility, honesty, truthfulness, loyalty, courage, nobility, selflessness or virtue. They are at best aimed at spreading genetic material, or else accidental byproducts (spandrels). If evolution happens to produce these “good” traits, then this fact is as meaningless as if evolution happened to produce their opposites. Traditional morality, which assumed that our consciences were at least relevant moral indicators, must be rewritten from scratch.

Well … now what? How then should we live? From where will we draw moral principles? There is no point telling us that it is possible to pretend that this never happened, that we can keep acting according to traditional moral principles. The point is not whether it is possible for human beings to act morally – we know from experience that it is. The question is whether there is any good reason for individuals to choose (traditional) “good” behaviour over “bad” behaviour, especially when it goes against our self-interest, or our desires. What if I don’t care about other people? Sure, the golden rule may be a good strategy on average, but why not take my chances with selfishness every now and then? What if I don’t care about what punishment I may receive? What if I enjoy theft, violence, rape, pedophilia, torture, murder? It is possible that evolution is true and yet we shouldn’t teach it in schools because it tends to produce unacceptable behavior. Why should truth and goodness coincide? How would Coyne reply to the Finland killer? These are hard questions, and glib answers will not do. Telling us that evolutionary theories of altruism are currently in need of empirical support is no answer at all.

I’ve previously been critical of Sam Harris, but he is at least asking the right questions. Thankfully there are those who are taking evolution and morality more seriously and skillfully than Coyne. I can recommend the podcast Morality in the Real World, over at commonsenseatheism.com . Also, anything Sean Carroll writes on morality (and most other topics) over at Cosmic Variance is worth a read.

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