“That being the case, the best approach is to carefully separate these two questions: 1. What range of the fundamental constants is life-permitting? 2. What is the probability that a universe, chosen at random from the range of possible universes, will fall in the life-permitting range? We are on much safer ground answering the first question.”

It seems to me strictly speaking impossible to give an answer to 2, given that there are an infinite number of life-permitting possible universes and an infinite number of non-life permitting possible universes. But I don’t think this matters, as we just need to focus on the set of possible universes with physical laws/initial conditions exactly the same as our own except that the values of the constants involved in physical laws/initial conditions vary. Call that set S. Then I think we can get a modified version of your question that we can answer: What is the probability that a universe, chosen at random from S, will fall in the life-permitting range?

Actually, that’s still not good enough, as there will still be an infinite number of universes in S. So we have to find some natural grouping of possible universes within S, S*, and then ask a modified version of your question in terms of S*. I suspect this is what physicists are actually doing when they defend probability claims with reference to fine-tuning, and if so, it seems to me perfectly philosophical defensible, despite the naysaying of certain philosophers.

Philip Goff

]]>If God wanted to create Eden, with a flat earth, and a geocentric universe he could have. And the laws of physics would be whatever describes the physics of the Eden universe.

As a Christian you have to believe that a world much more hospitable to life is possible, one even far better than the trillions of miles of lakefront property. A place with everlasting life. Your entire religion is based on thinking you go there when you die.

]]>It does matter if you want a multiverse to explain the value of the constant. We ask: what value of the CC would we expect if their were a multiverse? And, from our simulations, that number turns out to be about 50 times larger than the actual value. So it’s a problem for the multiverse, but not at all a problem for fine-tuning.

]]>